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ABSTRACT: There have been periodic electronic news media reports of potential bioterrorism-related incidents involving unknown sub-

stances (often referred to as “white powder”) since the 2001 intentional dissemination of Bacillus anthracis through the U.S. Postal System.
This study reviewed the number of unknown “white powder” incidents reported online by the electronic news media and compared them with
unknown “white powder” incidents reported to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the U.S. Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) during a 2-year period from June 1, 2009 and May 31, 2011. Results identified 297 electronic news media reports, 538
CDC reports, and 384 FBI reports of unknown “white powder.” This study showed different unknown “white powder” incidents captured by
each of the three sources. However, the authors could not determine the public health implications of this discordance.
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The 2001 incident wherein Bacillus anthracis spores were
distributed intentionally through the U.S. Postal System was the
first bioterrorism-related anthrax attack in the United States
(1,2). The news media (electronic, newspaper, television, radio)
brought increased awareness to the public about the use of
anthrax as a weapon of mass destruction (WMD). One television report indicated that the letters targeted prominent elected
officials, news anchors, and editors (3). Although the targets
may have been prominent officials, the victims of the attack
also included newspaper workers, postal workers, capitol build-
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ing workers, and a hospital worker (4). The anthrax spores used
in the attack were ground finely so that they could remain airborne longer, potentially providing more opportunities for it to
be suspended and inhaled. This incident resulted in five deaths
and 17 nonfatal illnesses (5,6). Because of this 2001 anthrax
incident, people now commonly think of an unknown substance
containing B. anthracis whenever there is a suspicious unknown
“white powder”. Even though major metropolitan areas were
targeted in 2001 (i.e., New York City, Washington, DC), the
use or threatened use of unknown substances (referred to as
unknown “white powder”) have been reported across the United
States.
Federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, or international agencies
can access CDC’s subject matter expertise in the public health
management of potential threat agents (including unknown
“white powder”) through various means. They can contact CDC
through the CDC Emergency Operations Center (EOC) which
serves as the CDC triage call center for all domestic and international public health-related emergency calls. They might also
directly contact CDC’s Division of Preparedness and Emerging
Infections, Emergency Preparedness and Response Branch
(DPEI/EPRB) which coordinates agency-wide responses to
actual or potential bioterrorism events. Callers specifically interested in anthrax or several other defined bacteria-associated
infectious diseases may already have working relationships with
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the epidemiologists or microbiologists in the Bacterial Special
Pathogens Branch (BSPB) and contact them directly. A fourth
entree into CDC occurs when a state or local public health
department or an agency like the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) sends specimens to a member of CDC’s Laboratory
Response Network (LRN) (7) which is overseen by CDC’s
Division of Preparedness and Emerging Infections, Laboratory
Preparedness and Response Branch (DPEI/LPRB).
The LRN is a network of approximately 150 laboratories
(mainly state and local public health laboratories) that can
respond to bioterrorism, chemical terrorism, and other public
health emergencies (8) (Fig. 1), and it uses a data exchange tool
called Results Messenger (RM) (9). While an incident involving
an unknown “white powder” may be reported directly to EOC
via a phone call, it is also through the LRN RM that CDC is
made aware of these incidents. Weekly, meetings are being held
that include staff from LPRB and EPRB to discuss current environmental and clinical laboratory incidents and test results
entered in the RM.
There is no statutory requirement for the CDC to be notified
about unknown “white powder” incidents, and unknown “white
powder” is not a notifiable disease (10). However, an agency
may contact CDC to request public health-related assistance
(e.g., epidemiologic, clinical, laboratory) in response to an
unknown “white powder” incident. In a previous study, almost
all calls to the Division of Bioterrorism Preparedness and
Response (now called the DPEI) requesting CDC assistance
were for clinical and/or laboratory consultation and/or request
for analysis of samples (11).
Furthermore, unknown “white powder” incidents are not
required to be reported to the FBI although it collaborates with
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the CDC to assist state, local, tribal, territorial, or international
agencies when requested. From a law enforcement point of view,
the mere presence of unknown “white powder” does not constitute a threat, and judgment and circumstance—and not statute–
are the more probable predictors of the likelihood that law
enforcement will be called to investigate what could well be
flour, powdered sugar, or cocaine. Of course, supplemental
information (e.g., threatening correspondence, secondary sources
of intelligence) enhances the perceived risk; thus, increasing the
likelihood that FBI will become involved.
The primary objective of this study is to review potential bioterrorism-related incidents involving unknown substances (often
referred to as “white powder”) reported to three sources: electronic news media, CDC, and FBI. A secondary objective is to
compare potential bioterrorism-related incidents involving
unknown “white powder” that were reported online by electronic
news media with unknown “white powder” incidents reported to
the CDC and the FBI for concordance. Third, we describe the
policies, procedures, and limitations faced by the CDC and FBI
ascertaining reporting of unknown “white powder” incidents.
Finally, we discuss reasons to reinforce the mutual commitment
to share information about unknown “white powder” and other
biothreat incidents between law enforcement and public health.
Methods
For electronic news media reports, we reviewed potential bioterrorism-related incidents limited to those involving unknown
“white powder” that were reported online during a 2-year period
from June 1, 2009 to May 31, 2011 and compared them with
similar incidents reported to the CDC and the FBI. We selected

FIG. 1––Map coverage of the Laboratory Response Network in the United States of America, February 2013 (Source: http://www.bt.cdc.gov/lrn/usmap.asp).
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only those electronic news media reports posted online by established national, state and local news corporations (e.g., CNN
News, The Washington Post, The Boston Globe). For purposes
of this study, we refer to CDC reports as those incidents called
in by outside agencies notifying CDC Programs or subject matter experts of such incidents as well as those laboratory results
entered in the LRN RM database. FBI data were provided by
the WMD Directorate and represented reports compiled by their
field offices throughout the United States.
The number of “electronic news media” reports was ascertained through internet searches for unknown “white powder”
using Yahoo and Google search engines. A particular incident
may be reported in two or more stories in the electronic news
media reports, and an unknown “white powder” incident may
also be reported more than once in each of the CDC and FBI
databases because of updates or progress reports. However, for
purposes of this study, unduplication efforts attempted to treat
these as a single incident when it could be validated that they
were redundant or updated reports.
The following types of information were abstracted from each
data source: report date, state of incident occurrence, specific
location of incidence, identification of the unknown “white powders”, and agencies involved in the consultation and response.
We then described the geographic distribution and location of
unknown “white powder” incidents, tabulated unknown “white
powder” incidents by FBI region and source of information, and
tabulated identities of unknown “white powder” as reported in
the electronic news media. We constructed an electronic database using Excel 2003 and performed descriptive statistical
analyses using SPSS 17.0 (IBM Corporation, Armonk, New
York, USA) and SAS 9.2 (SAS Institute Inc., Cary, North Carolina, USA).
Results
There were 297 unknown “white powder” incidents from 43
states and the District of Columbia that were reported online by

the electronic news media. In comparison, there were 538
unknown “white powder” incidents that were reported to CDC,
and there were 384 unknown “white powder” incidents reported
to the FBI WMD during the same period of time. There were
five unknown “white powder” incidents that were reported in
both the electronic news media and CDC.
For the FBI data, we found that “region” was the smallest
geographic parameter that is available for analysis. It was not
possible to correlate unknown “white powder” incidents from
the three sources at the state level. Therefore, we were not able
to determine how many unknown “white powder” incidents were
reported to the FBI and similarly reported to CDC and/or covered by the electronic news media.
Figure 2 shows that many of the electronic news mediareported domestic incidents came from Florida (n = 31, 10.4%),
California (n = 26, 8.8%), Texas (n = 23, 7.7%), New Jersey
(n = 21, 7.1%), New York (=19, 6.4%), Alabama (n = 13,
4.4%), Utah (n = 13, 4.4%), Virginia (n = 12, 4.0%), Washington, DC (n = 10, 3.4%), and Massachusetts (n = 10, 3.4%).
Figure 3 shows that unknown “white powder” incidents
reported by the electronic news media occurred in law enforcement offices, courthouses, and jail/correctional facilities (n = 38,
12.7%). Government locations other than those three mentioned
previously (n = 80, 26.9%) included “federal building mailrooms”, “state offices”, “city hall”, Internal Revenue Service,
U.S. Attorney’s Office, Senator’s office, Division of Motor
Vehicle, Veterans Affairs Administration, U.S. Post Office, “military call center”, State Attorney General’s office, Social Security
Administration, and “others”. “Other” locations included a mailbox, a not-for-profit organization, and a car in a parking lot,
among others.
Table 1 shows the frequency distribution of unknown “white
powder” incidents by FBI regions from the three sources of
information: electronic news media, CDC, and the FBI. This also
shows that the CDC had more unknown “white powder” incidents (n = 538) than those reported in the electronic news media
(n = 297) and the FBI (n = 384).

FIG. 2––U.S.A. map showing frequency distribution of electronic news media unknown “white powder” incidents by state, 2009–2011 (n = 297).
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FIG. 3––Electronic news media reports of unknown “white powder” incidents by location, U.S.A., 2009–2011 (n = 297).

TABLE 1––Unknown “white powder” incidents* by Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) region† and source of information: January 1, 2009–May
31, 2011.
Source of Information
News Media
Region
Central
Northeast
Southeast
West
Total=

CDC

FBI

n

%

n

%

n

%

39
95
71
92
297

13.13
31.99
23.91
30.98
100.00

94
269
58
117
538

17.50
50.00
10.80
21.70
100.00

87
122
66
109
384

22.66
31.77
17.19
28.39
100.00

*Redundant or updated reports of the same unknown “white powder”
incident are counted as one incident.
†
Region (field office area of responsibility): Northeast—New York,
Maryland, West Virginia, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New
Jersey, Washington, DC, Northern Virginia, Vermont, Pennsylvania, Maine,
Delaware, New Hampshire; Southeast—Rest of Virginia, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Kentucky, Tennessee, Puerto
Rico; Central—Ohio, Michigan, Illinois, Indiana, Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Kansas, Oklahoma, Nebraska, North Dakota, South
Dakota, Iowa, Minnesota, Wisconsin; West—California, Oregon, Idaho,
Washington, Montana, Colorado, Nevada, Texas, New Mexico, Arizona,
Alaska, Hawaii, Wyoming, Utah.

The majority of electronic news media reports (n = 223,
75.1%) did not mention the final identity of the unknown “white
powders.” Table 2 shows that those that were identified included
sugar/artificial sweetener (n = 10, 13.5%), flour (n = 9, 12.2%),
baby powder (n = 5, 6.8%), and talcum powder (n = 5, 6.8%).
None of the substances were identified as a bioterrorism agent.
However, the electronic news media did not indicate how they
determined the components/ingredients of those unknown “white
powders.” In contrast to the electronic news media, CDC and

TABLE 2––Identities of unknown “white powder” as reported in the electronic news media, United States, 2009–2011 (n = 74)*.
Identity

n

%

Sugar/artificial sweetener
Flour
Baby powder
Talcum powder
Medical powder (e.g., antibiotic, aspirin, pain pill)
Narcotic (e.g., methamphetamine, cocaine)
Baking powder
Baking soda
Coffee creamer
Corn starch
Baby formula
Candy
Cream of wheat
Fire extinguisher residue
Bean substance and cream sauce
Boric acid or warfarin
Brownie or cake baking mix
Calcium carbonate (main component of chalk)
Crushed silica
Foot powder
Instant soup
Office dust
Ordinary household product
Powdered Alfredo sauce
School project source
Soap shavings
Sodium bicarbonate
Table salt
Titanium dioxide
Ultra slim-fast powder
Whey powder
Total=

10
9
5
5
4
4
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
74

13.5
12.2
6.8
6.8
5.4
5.4
4.1
4.1
4.1
4.1
2.7
2.7
2.7
2.7
1.4
1.4
1.4
1.4
1.4
1.4
1.4
1.4
1.4
1.4
1.4
1.4
1.4
1.4
1.4
1.4
1.4
100.0

*223 electronic news media reports did not mention anything about the
identity of the unknown “white powder”.
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FBI laboratories could not report final identities of the unknown
“white powders”.
Joint public health and FBI investigations were mentioned in
some of the electronic news media reports (n = 66, 22.2%).
Other responders that were commonly mentioned in the electronic news media reports were fire departments (n = 56, 18.9%)
and police departments (n = 51, 17.2%) which could be at the
state or local levels. Less frequently mentioned responders
included “hazmat teams”, Department of Homeland Security,
United Nations Security Staff, the United States Postal Service,
Department of Environmental Protection, Sheriff’s Office, “bomb
squad”, Emergency Management Director, Environmental Health
and Safety, Regional Transit Authority, U.S. Marshals, and
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives.
Discussion
Increased public awareness about unknown “white powder”
incidents began after the intentional dissemination of B. anthracis spores through the U.S. Postal System in 2001 because of
the many media reports. Unknown “white powder” incidents
occurred in practically every state and region, but it is not
known how many of these were intentionally disseminated with
malicious intent versus the number of unknown “white powders”
that just happened to be noticed but were unintentional. In addition, they also occurred in various public or private places.
Although none of the suspicious unknown “white powders”
contained B. anthracis or other bioterrorism agents in this study,
one cannot assume that unknown “white powders” are harmless
nor conclude that they pose no public health or national security
threat at the time the unknown “white powder” is discovered.
The potential and unknown threat before the unknown “white
powder” is discovered can only be ascertained after a thorough
investigation and completion of laboratory tests. A review of
these unknown “white powder” incidents from all three sources
indicates that the presence of an unknown “white powder” may
be a threat although the percentage of these incidents that
involved the intentional and malevolent versus the unintentional
dissemination of powder (e.g., spilled sugar) could not be determined in this study.
Shortly after the 2001 anthrax incident, CDC and FBI colleagues published a paper that described the complementary benefits of collaboration between public health and law enforcement
agencies during investigations of bioterrorism incidents (in general) and unknown “white powder” incidents (in particular) (11).
The FBI may receive a report of any unknown “white powder”
incident, but it may only investigate when there are surrounding
circumstances that indicate a crime may have been committed.
Although not required by any law or statute, CDC can be
notified about unknown “white powder” incidents through calls
to the CDC EOC or a CDC program and upon request for assistance from a state, local, tribal, territorial, or international health
department or agency. Given the number of reports included in
the CDC, FBI, and electronic media datasets, the number of
unknown “white powder” incidents during a nonheighten public
awareness period was found to be in the hundreds, and they are
distributed throughout the United States. In existing practice,
unknown “white powder” incidents are managed at the local
level.
Every state has at least one LRN laboratory, and due to its
unique role, it is likely that samples from an unknown “white
powder” incident will be sent to a LRN laboratory to be tested
for biological threat agents. Given that so few non-LRN labora-

tories have the ability to test for biothreat agents and given that
both State Health Departments and the FBI will send suspicious
substances to LRN laboratories, the CDC-managed LRN RM
database may be the most definitive database of unknown “white
powder” incidents in the United States. However, it only captures those incidents that were suspicious enough to have a specimen collected and sent for analysis.
Existing CDC/FBI protocols require that samples that are collected in unknown “white powder” incidents in which the FBI is
informed are sent to a LRN laboratory—or comparable national
laboratory (e.g., Sandia, Lawrence Livermore)—for analyses. In
contrast to the electronic news media reports, however, CDC
and FBI data do not report the final identity of the unknown
“white powders”. LRN or other comparable laboratories test only
for the presence or absence of specific threat agents including
B. anthracis that may exist within the white powder.
Data from FBI WMD database and CDC LRN RM database
should ideally capture the overwhelming majority of unknown
“white powder” incidents that come to the attention of authorities. The fact that CDC and the FBI use a shared asset (i.e.,
LRN member laboratories) to test suspicious biothreat agents
enhances the likelihood that FBI and CDC will know about the
same incidents. However, some incidents are ongoing FBI investigations and for reasons of national security, information about
them cannot be shared with other government entities nor
divulged to the public. Therefore, it is not possible for the
authors in this study to determine how many discrete incidents
reported to FBI were also reported to CDC and/or covered by
the electronic news media because of the sensitive nature of the
FBI data.
Absolute correlation between the databases is not possible.
For example, northern Virginia unknown “white powder” incidents were reported to the northeast FBI region while the rest of
unknown “white powder” incidents that occurred in Virginia
were reported to the southeast FBI region. Given the sensitivity
of the FBI data, “region” is the smallest geographic parameter
that is available for publication. Therefore, it would be impossible to correlate unknown “white powder” incidents from the
three sources at the state level.
The response to unknown “white powder” incidents involves
responders from various disciplines (e.g., public health, law
enforcement officers, Fire/EMS). Because unknown “white powder” incidents are a common occurrence in every state, the
responses to these incidents likely require significant human and
financial resources. An example of the resources needed to
respond to just one of these incidents occurred in Utah. An
unknown “white powder” investigated in Utah turned out to be a
silicon powder used in shipping, but the response involved 25
members of the Fire Department and an eight-person hazmat
team (12). This response not only entailed a large financial cost,
but it also took away human resources from their traditional
day-to-day services.
The collaborative efforts between law enforcement and public
health during the 2001 anthrax attacks were something new at
that time, and it required venturing into unfamiliar territory for
many public health and law enforcement officials (13–15). Nevertheless, it showed the importance of an effective collaboration
between public health and law enforcement or on hospital collaboration with public safety organizations on bioterrorism
response (16–20). This limitation is partially offset by an ongoing dialog between CDC and FBI. The working relationship that
blossomed during the 2001 investigation of B. anthracis through
the U.S. Postal System has evolved to the institutionalization of
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a joint criminal and epidemiological investigations workshop that
is offered to public health and law enforcement professionals
throughout the United States. To date, 32 Joint Criminal and
Epidemiological Investigations Workshops have been conducted,
training over 2,900 participants from law enforcement, public
health, emergency services, and other agencies.
The Joint Criminal and Epidemiological Investigation Workshop promotes a greater understanding among law enforcement
and public health personnel regarding their roles, responsibilities
and information needs for the response to biological threats.
Some states and local jurisdictions have used the workshop as
the foundation for developing a memorandum of understanding
(MOU) or written protocol to guide joint investigation activities
between law enforcement and public health. CDC and FBI
signed their own memorandum for joint public health-law
enforcement investigations in February 2013. These MOUs
along with periodic joint exercises reduce barriers that existed
between the two professions and increase the informal sharing of
information that does not exist on any database nor required by
any statute.
In summary, correlating data from the three sources into a
national picture have several limitations, and public health implications of these findings are unknown. First, there is no requirement for FBI to be informed of all unknown “white powder”
incidents. Second, CDC collects data only if there is a confirmed
laboratory test result, if there is a credible threat as reported by
the FBI, or if there is a request for technical assistance from a
state or local health department. Thus, it is likely that unknown
“white powder” incidents in this study were underreported.
Third, emergency responses (public safety, law enforcement or
public health) to unknown “white powder” incidents are generally managed at the state/local level. If state/local agencies determine that there is no credible threat, they may decide not to
report the incident to the FBI nor CDC.
Conclusion
This paper showed that there has been an increased public
awareness and interest (given the number of stories) regarding
unknown “white powder” incidents since the 2001 intentional
dissemination of B. anthracis spores through the U.S. Postal
System. This study also showed that none of the three entities
collected data for all unknown “white powder” incidents; however, the public health implications of this finding could not be
determined.
Unknown “white powder” incidents occurred in practically
every state and region. In addition, they also occurred in various
public or private places. However, it is not known how many of
these were intentionally disseminated with malicious intent versus the number of unknown “white powders” that just happened
to be noticed but were unintentional.
Furthermore, results of this study serve as a reminder that
unknown “white powder” incidents require an integrated
response with personnel from various disciplines: public health,
law enforcement, and Fire/EMS. Collaborative efforts between
law enforcement and public health continue to be enhanced
including routine sharing of information. This data sharing
(along with other collaborative endeavors such as joint training
and exercises) is critical to assure that any state or local jurisdiction is prepared to respond to perceived or actual biological
threat agents in the future.
Ideally, data collection and reporting of potential bioterrorismrelated incidents involving unknown “white powder” can be
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improved if all local law enforcement agencies and other
agencies involved will report these incidents to a national or
centralized electronic reporting system. Perhaps, a system similar
to the Drug Abuse Warning Network (21) or other federal electronic reporting systems could be set up. Such a humongous project, however, will require much-needed buy-ins from various
partners and stakeholders.
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